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1. Introduction 
The allocation of grants from central governments to subnational jurisdictions 
has been a major topic of research for quite a long time. Early studies on this topic 
viewed the agents responsible for the transfer of resources to local communities as 
benevolent dictators whose only objective was the maximization of social welfare. 
More recently, and less naïvely, it has been argued that political factors, such as 
reelection purposes, partisan effects, and lobbying by interest groups, also play an 
important role. 
This article’s main objective is to evaluate the influence of political forces in the 
allocation of Portuguese intergovernmental grants. We model the central government’s 
behavior in the grants allocation process to municipalities as a function of variables 
reflecting the twofold desire to improve social welfare and government’s self-interests. 
Results of estimations performed on a large and detailed dataset covering all mainland 
municipalities, from 1979 to 2001, using the system-generalized method of moments 
(GMM) for linear dynamic panel data models, allow us to conclude that both social 
welfare and political variables condition the allocation process. There is strong 
empirical evidence of grant increases in municipal and legislative election years. 
Furthermore, municipalities ruled by mayors that stayed longer in office or belong to 
the prime-minister’s party seem to be favored in the grants distribution process. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews recent contributions 
to the literature on this topic. Section 3 describes the institutional framework in which 
the flow of intergovernmental grants from the central to municipal governments is 
determined. Sections 4 and 5 describe the dataset and the empirical model, respectively. 
Section 6 presents the empirical results and, finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. The literature 
In this section we review the literature on intergovernmental grants. We start by 
presenting the normative approach to intergovernmental grants, and then proceed to the 
public choice view, according to which the self-interest of grant givers should also be 
taken into account. We focus on empirical contributions that stand out either for the 
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seminal nature of the formulated hypotheses, or for the scope of the empirical 
application. 
Intergovernmental grants can be classified as unconditional, when they may be 
used according to the wishes of the recipient, and conditional, when certain restrictions 
must be met by the recipient governments (Rosen, 2002). Conditional grants often take 
the form of matching grants: a certain proportion of a specific project is financed by the 
central government, but must be supplemented with outlays of the recipient 
governments. This is done in order to induce the latter to take the project’s externalities 
into consideration when deciding on its implementation. Finally, grants can also consist 
of reimbursements of costs supported by local governments. 
The normative approach to intergovernmental grants assumes that central 
governments are motivated by efficiency, equity or stabilization goals, seeking the 
maximization of the general welfare of the population1. In this context, the settlement of 
grants is mainly supported by formulas, which use indicators of the needs of the 
population and of the local fiscal capacity. 
The arguments of the traditional approach are, therefore, mainly three2. The first 
concerns efficiency in the provision of public goods, which may depend upon the 
proximity between the provider and the consumers. In order to provide the lower level 
governments with the necessary resources to supply local public goods, central 
governments transfer some fiscal power to the former. In addition to directly providing 
a source of funds, conditional grants can also generate incentives for local governments 
to provide larger amounts of local goods. Efficiency in the allocation of local resources 
may be facilitated by the provision of spending inducements to lower level governments 
that supply goods creating interjurisdictional beneficial spillovers. If the external utility 
of these locally provided goods were not considered, they would be supplied in 
insufficient quantities. Grants from an upper level government reduce the efficiency 
problems resulting from the fact that the benefits of local expenditures spill over 
jurisdictional boundaries. Conditional matching grants can be used to bring local 
incentives in line with efficiency when goods produce positive externalities in 
neighboring municipalities. 
                                                          
1 See Musgrave (1998) for a more detailed analysis. 
2 See Gramlich (1998), Snoddon and Wen (1999) and Rosen (2002) for a detailed analysis of the 
rationales for intergovernmental grants. 
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A second goal is the achievement of a balance (vertical financial balance) 
between responsibilities and resources of each governmental level. Revenues may be 
most efficiently collected by a national government, but most efficiently spent at the 
municipal government level. Overall efficiency would then require revenue sharing 
between governmental levels. In addition, if equity is a goal, revenue sharing can be 
used to transfer resources to the most needed regions, that is, those with lower fiscal 
capacity. In order to provide the necessary amount of local public goods, these regions 
would otherwise have to impose higher tax burdens on their populations. In this line of 
reasoning, grants are used to achieve horizontal financial balance (fiscal equalization), 
that is, geographical equity. Grants aiming at equity are, in general, unconditional 
grants, so that recipient governments can decide on the best way to spend them. 
Finally, there is the economic stabilization argument, according to which the 
central government budget should be used to stabilize local public expenditures and 
employment. This argument would also justify the application of taxes to local 
governments in periods of economic growth but a central government would hardly 
propose such policy. 
The economics literature has also provided some positive explanations for the 
allocation of intergovernmental grants. Among these, the approaches that emphasize the 
importance of political factors deserve particular attention. In this view, the policies 
conducted by the central government are determined, at least partly, by its attempt to 
maximize its own utility function. When choosing among alternative policies, a 
government will adopt the one that maximizes its utility, which might simply depend 
upon the probability of reelection. In this context, the economic literature has analyzed 
the allocation of intergovernmental grants as a strategic tool (both in terms of the 
amounts to be transferred and of the allocation formulas) of central governments as 
aimed at reelection. 
In the beginning of the 1980’s, pioneering contributions to this literature were 
performed by Gist and Hill (1981 and 1984). Using data from the Urban Development 
Action Grant (UDAG) program of the USA Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) they tested if the selection of project applications for funds was 
conditioned by both public interest goals and bureaucratic motives (bureaucratic goals 
are described by Niskanen, 1975). Estimations by maximum likelihood methods 
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generated empirical evidence supporting the Niskanen hypothesis: in the selection 
process bureaucrats adopted a criterion that, although fulfilling legal obligations, 
worked in their own interest. In particular, they favored projects with a high probability 
of success defined in terms of their “financial return”, that is those that generated 
greater prestige to the granting agency. 
Alperovich (1984) presented one of the first political economy analysis of 
intergovernmental grants to local authorities. Using data for 52 local authorities in 
Israel, for two different years, under two different governments, he tested whether the 
grant allocation process was determined by the willingness to improve public interest or 
the desire to be re-elected. Assuming that grants that are predetermined by legislative 
formulas are not under the discretion of politicians he focused on non-formula grants. 
The author concluded that there were significant differences in the behavior of the two 
governments regarding objective variables, such as the size of locality, local deficits, 
and the ratio of dependent population to population in the labor force. However, both 
governments followed political objectives in the allocation of grants. They attempted to 
maximize the prospects for re-election, by pursuing policies that reward their supporters 
rather than “buy-off” their opponents. 
Grossman (1994) extended Alperovich’s work by introducing additional 
political variables. According to his model, federal politicians are self-interested vote 
maximizers that distribute grants to achieve reelection. Grants are used to buy the 
support of state voters and the political capital of local politicians, bureaucrats and 
interest groups which can be used to further increase the support of state voters to the 
federal politician. He used the percentage of votes cast by the governor’s party in office 
in the state and the percentage of seats in the State House held by the governor’s party 
in office as indicators of the political stance of a state. He also considered interest group 
pressure by introducing state and local government employment per capita and union 
membership per capita as explanatory variables. The model was tested for 49 U.S. 
states during the years of 1974, 1977, 1980 and 1983. Empirical results suggested that 
similarity of party affiliation between federal and state politicians increase the amount 
of grants made to a state, as well as the importance of state interest groups. Contrary to 
expectations, states with higher income per capita received higher grants per capita. 
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 Pereira (1996) introduced a new argument: the regressivity or progressivity of 
per capita lump-sum grants towards community size is related mainly to the structure of 
the lobbying activities of local governments and independent of hypothetical economies 
or diseconomies of scale in the production of local public goods. An empirical analysis 
was conducted on 186 Portuguese municipalities (with more than 10 000 inhabitants in 
1991 and excluding the three largest municipalities), with 1989 data. The findings 
supported the political-economic approach and rejected the hypothesis that the 
economies of scale are the main explanatory cause for the observed regressivity of per 
capita lump-sum grants. The political variable introduced by Alperovich (1984) was not 
statistically significant. Pereira pointed out two possible reasons for this result: first, the 
central government can either reward its political supporters or buy the votes of its 
opponents and, second, the number of votes may be more important to the central 
government than its proportion. 
 The studies described so far have not used data pooled over several years. 
Bungey et al (1991) using pooled data for 6 Australian states, for the period 1956-57 to 
1985-86, tested two competing models explaining the distribution of federal grants. 
They considered both the traditional approach, based on efficiency, equity and ideology, 
and the public choice approach, which attempts to capture vote trading and bargaining 
by politicians in the determination of intergovernmental grants. Using five political 
variables, the authors concluded that the public choice model adds nothing to the 
traditional model. However, they argued that this result did not imply that the public 
choice argument was invalid since the adopted specification may not have been 
adequate. 
 Worthington and Dollery (1998), also using panel data on 6 Australian states, 
but for a different period (1981-82 to 1991-92) analyzed the determinants of 
intergovernmental grants in Education, Health and Social Security and Welfare. The 
main finding was that central government politicians use the grants process to purchase 
political capital at the federal level in order to enhance their chances of reelection. 
Porto and Sanguinetti (2001) researched the determinants of per capita federal 
grants allocation across 22 Argentine provinces during four periods (each one 
representing a decade). Their analysis suggests that the political representation of 
jurisdictions at the Congress, measured by the number of deputies and the number of 
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senators per capita, influences the distribution of federal grants. They claim that the 
significant disparity observed in the per capita representation across different provinces 
is an important factor explaining the allocation of transfers. 
Feld and Schaltegger (2002) were the first to present evidence on the 
determinants of intergovernmental grants in Switzerland. Using yearly data on 
conditional and unconditional grants for 26 Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998, the 
authors analyzed the extent to which the amount of per capita grants can be explained 
by traditional and political-economic arguments. In particular, they investigated 
whether interest groups (measured by union density) and bureaucracy power (measured 
by the share of administration employees) had an impact on the granting system. They 
argued that fiscal referenda have the ability to restrict the impact of interest groups in 
the determination of intergovernmental grants. In fact, they found evidence that fiscal 
referenda led to lower grants, reducing the impact of state bureaucrats and trade unions 
in the determination of grants. 
Johansson (2003) tested the hypothesis that grants to local governments are used 
strategically by the central government to enhance its changes of reelection. Empirical 
work on a panel dataset consisting of 255 Swedish municipalities, from 1981 to 1995, 
suggests that municipalities with more swing voters receive higher grants. Therefore, 
intergovernmental grants are used in order to win votes. 
Lowry and Potoski (2004) refined the Grossman’s (1994) study, by investigating 
how interest groups influence federal discretionary grants across seven policy areas. 
According to their results, interest groups and private and public organizations, by 
indirectly reflecting citizen preferences, influence the allocation of federal discretionary 
grants. 
The above-mentioned studies present considerable evidence supporting the 
importance of political factors in the allocation of intergovernmental grants. To our 
knowledge, there is only one article, Pereira (1996), investigating the determinants of 
intergovernmental grants in Portugal using a political-economic approach3. Other 
                                                          
3 Santos (1991), in an estimation of the demand for local public services in Portugal, regresses current 
local expenditures on goods and services on a set of variables that includes a political dummy variable 
used to test if left-wing parties have a higher preference for publicly provided services. The estimated 
coefficient is positively signed, as expected, and is statistically significant at the 90% level. 
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contributions have, however, been produced focusing mainly on efficiency and equity 
goals. In the next paragraph, we briefly review these contributions. 
Cohn and Costa (1986) estimated a production function for municipalities. They 
concluded that grants lead to inefficiency because the effect of the lower elasticity of 
public capital in municipalities with greater needs more than compensates the increase 
in total public expenditure. The purpose of Osório (1998) and Costa and Osório (1999) 
was to test whether the redistributive nature of unconditional grants led to inefficiency 
in production. After estimating a cost function for municipalities and calculating a cost-
efficiency index, the authors found no evidence of a negative impact of unconditional 
grants on the cost efficiency of municipalities. Moreover, the results concerning the 
political variables included in the analysis were not clear. Pereira and Silva (1999) 
argued that the formula according to which Portuguese grants to municipalities are 
calculated is not economically rational because it does not properly capture the fiscal 
capacity and the needs of the population. In order to overcome these caveats, the 
authors propose a new methodology emphasizing the fiscal capacity of the 
municipalities. Costa and Silva (2000) investigated, for the municipalities of northern 
Portugal, the causality between per capita grants and the tax capacity (horizontal 
equity). They concluded that municipalities’ tax effort is negatively influenced by per 
capita unconditional grants. Melo’s (2000) purpose was to highlight the differences 
between the Local Finance Law n. 42/98 and the previous legislation, by evaluating 
vertical and horizontal rebalances. He analyzed the changes in the geographical patterns 
of unconditional grants allocation to municipalities. Melo stressed the need to 
complement his descriptive analysis with other approaches, namely the political one. 
The main purpose of our research is to shed some light on the influence of 
political forces in the Portuguese granting system. We extend Pereira’s (1996) research 
by taking into account additional variables in the explanation of the intergovernmental 
grants allocation process, and by exploring a larger and much more detailed dataset. We 
use as our laboratory all the mainland Portuguese municipalities for the 1979 to 2001 
period. 
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3. The Portuguese political and institutional framework 
Portugal is a recent democracy; democracy was re-established after the April 
25th 1974 revolution. A new Constitution came into effect on April 25th 1976 and 
legislative elections were held on the same day. See table 1 for a summary of legislative 
electoral results in the post-revolution period. 
 
(Table 1, Page 25) 
 
The first years of the democratic period were characterized by high political 
instability. Until 1987, several minority governments ruled but did not manage to stay 
in office the entire term. In 1979, the first year in our sample, the 5th constitutional 
government, a care-taking government appointed by the President, was in office and 
ruled from November 1978 to July 1979. It was followed by a minority government that 
ruled until January 1980. After that, a government coalition (Aliança Democrática) 
formed by three right-wing parties (PSD-Social Democratic Party, CDS-Democratic 
and Social Center and PPM-Monarchic People’s Party) was in office till June 1983. 
Another coalition government (Bloco Central), formed by a right and a left-wing party 
(PSD and PS-Socialist Party), stayed in office until 1985. From the end of 1985 until 
1995, the party in office was the PSD. In 1987, after two years in office as a minority 
government, this party won a majority of votes for the first time since the re-
establishment of democracy. It repeated the majority in the subsequent balloting held in 
1991. At the end of 1995, the party in office changed again: the socialist party (PS) won 
the elections and stayed in office until 2002. After that the country has been ruled by a 
coalition formed by PSD and CDS/PP. During the period considered in this paper there 
were 11 constitutional governments (see table 2). 
 
(Table 2, Page 26)
 
Regarding local governments, the first municipal elections were held in 1976 and 
since then seven ballotings have taken place. Until 1985, municipal elections occurred 
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every three years, and after that the municipal governments’ term was extended to four 
years. Elections have always taken place in December4. 
The Portuguese Constitution of 1976, the Local Power Law (Law n. 79/77, 
October 25) and the first Local Finance Law (Law n. 1/79, January 2) brought new 
responsibilities and more power to municipalities, allowing for a local finance reform 
through the consolidation of the financial decentralization (Santos and Vasconcelos e 
Sá, 1996). The implementation of the subsidiarity principle and, subsequently, the 
principle of local autonomy provided resources and more discretionary power to 
municipalities. 
Portuguese municipalities receive both conditional and unconditional grants. 
Conditional grants provide a larger degree of discretion to the central government than 
unconditional grants. European Union’s structural funds are a special case of 
conditional grants. They are allocated to each municipality by a central government 
agency that must follow the procedures established by a support framework in the 
selection process of the projects to be financed (Baleiras, 1997). If the project is 
selected, the municipality receives additional grants against the execution of 
infrastructure investments in, for example, the road network, the water supply or the 
sewage collection. Conditional transfers from the central government to municipalities 
are mainly regulated by contract and specific programs. 
The first version of the Local Finance Law (Law n. 1/79) mentioned the 
possibility of conditional financial help from the central government to municipalities in 
case of public disaster or unusual circumstances. The Law n. 1/87 (January 6) also 
considered the possibility of technical and financial cooperation between the central 
government and municipalities aiming the promotion of regional and local 
development. The regulatory framework of this system of financial help is established 
by the central government in the form of decree-laws. In 1998, a new Local Finance 
Law was enacted (Law n. 42/98, August 6). It still allows for help by the central 
government if the regional development is at stake or if there is an urgent need of funds 
that cannot be provided by the municipality. This law also extends the scope of 
technical and financial cooperation, for example, to municipalities negatively affected 
                                                          
4 Municipal elections took place at December 12, 1976; December 16, 1979; December 12, 1982; 
December 15, 1985; December 17, 1989; December 12, 1993; December 14, 1997; and December 16, 
2001.  
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by central government investments or in case of a freguesia creation. The regulatory 
framework is still defined in the form of a decree-law. 
As for unconditional grants, the discretionary autonomy of the grant giver is 
more limited since, in the Portuguese case, they are established by a fiscal rule and are 
formula-based transfers. According to the Portuguese Constitution, municipalities have 
the right to share national fiscal revenues. The central government which, as is 
generally accepted, collects taxes more efficiently than local governments, redistributes 
part of the tax revenue to local governments through unconditional grants. The next 
paragraphs briefly review the legal changes that occurred during the period analyzed in 
the allocation criteria of unconditional grants. Table 3 summarizes these changes. 
 
(Table 3, Page 27)
 
 Law n. 1/79 (January 2) establishes the framework governing unconditional 
grants from the central government to municipalities and sets up a direct relationship (of 
no less than 18%) between the total amount of unconditional grants to municipalities 
and the National Budget capital and current expenditures. Until 1987, the total amount 
of unconditional grants was not formula driven and was published each year in the 
National Budget Law. These grants result from the municipalities right to share tax 
revenues collected at the central level (artº 5º.b) and other revenues as a financial 
equilibrium fund (artº 5º.c) and were transferred to local governments in twelve shares. 
In the Decree-law 98/84 (March 29), all unconditional grants allocated to 
municipalities by the National Budget became known as the Financial Balance Fund 
(Fundo de Equilíbrio Financeiro, FEF). Note that this decree-law explicitly allows for 
the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira to apply specific rules to their 
municipalities (artº 30º). The same happens in the subsequent legislation (Law n. 1/87, 
artº 28º, Law n. 42/98, artº 35º). 
Law n. 1/87 (January 6) established that the total amount of FEF should be 
annually corrected on the basis of the expected change in the value-added tax (VAT) 
revenue5 as expressed in the National Budget. A tenth of the FEF’s total amount was 
                                                          
5 



−−
=
1tVAT
tVAT
1tFEFtFEF  
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equally distributed among all municipalities. The remaining was divided among 
municipalities in direct proportion of the following set of indicators: population6, area, 
per capita direct taxes, municipal road network, number of dwellings, number of 
freguesias and a socio-economic development index (computed on the basis of the 
degree of industrialization, the importance of the primary sector, a total dependency 
coefficient, an accessibility index, the needs in terms of basic infra-structures and the 
per capita energy domestic consumption). The National Budget Law established, each 
year, the FEF proportions in terms of capital and current grants, so that the former 
would be no less than 40% of the total amount. 
However, the law defined a transitory regime between 1987 and 1990. In 1987 
80% of the FEF was allocated to each municipality according to the 1986 criteria. In the 
following years this percentage decreased 20 points yearly. The remaining funds were 
distributed according to the criteria defined by the new law under the condition that no 
municipality would receive less than it had benefited in the previous year. 
Compared to the Law n. 1/79, the 1987 Law attempted to simplify the allocation 
criteria, by replacing the needs index (as needs were found difficult to measure) by a 
socio-economic development index based on a set of socio-economic indicators. Still, 
these allocation criteria were found to be complex (Santos and Vasconcelos e Sá, 1996). 
The National Budget Law of 1992 simplified the allocation framework: the socio-
economic development index was excluded as well as some socio-economic indicators 
that were on the basis of its calculation. The per capita direct taxes criterion was 
replaced by the difference between per capita main direct taxes and the correspondent 
national average. This tax-base equalization element (a fiscal need index) was 
introduced with a coefficient of 5%. Nevertheless, more importance was given to the 
equalization of municipalities’ needs than the fiscal capacity of their fiscal capacity. 
In 1998 a new law was approved (Law n. 42/98) and replaced the FEF by the 
Municipal General Fund (Fundo Geral Municipal, FGM) and the Municipal Cohesion 
Fund (Fundo de Coesão Municipal, FCM)7. The total amount of these funds was 
established as a proportion (30,5%: 24% for FGM and 6,5% for FCM) of the actual tax 
revenues generated two years before by the income taxes, and the value added tax. This 
                                                          
6 Population was considered the main needs indicator with a coefficient of 45% (even if in the National 
Budget Law of 1992 it was lowered to 40%). 
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represents an important change from the previous law according to which the amount of 
funds to be transferred was calculated as a percentage of expected tax collection, 
leading to systematic under evaluations of the tax revenues. The FGM was created to 
provide municipalities with adequate financial resources for the execution of their tasks, 
as a function of their levels of operation and investment. It was computed on the basis 
of the ratio of nights spend in tourist facilities to population, per capita direct taxes, 
number of freguesias, area and the population under 15 years old. 
In opposition to the FGM, the FCM is not allocated to all municipalities. The 
FCM intends to promote an horizontal balance, that is, to reduce inequity among local 
jurisdictions. This fund is only transferred to municipalities that have a development 
index (computed on the basis of two indexes: a fiscal need index and an opportunity 
disparity index) below the national average. 
In 2001 (National Budget Law, artº 12º), the Municipal Basis Fund (Fundo de 
Base Municipal, FBM) was created to complement the other two. It allocates an equal 
amount of resources to each municipality, both in terms of capital and current revenues. 
From the description presented above, one can conclude that, during the period 
under analysis, considerable changes occurred both in the conditional and the 
unconditional grants allocation process from the central government to local authorities. 
 
4. The dataset 
We use as our laboratory a large and unexplored dataset containing information 
on all Portuguese mainland municipalities (278) from 1979 to 20018. 
Data on population and on transfers from the central government to the local 
authorities was obtained from the Municipalities General Direction’s (“Direcção Geral 
das Autarquias Locais”) annual report called Finanças Municipais (Municipal 
Finances). This report exists from 1978 to 1983 and from 1986 to 2001. For the two 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 This law established a transitory regime concerning the FGM and FCM total amount and the formula of 
allocation to municipalities for 1999, 2000 and 2001 (artº 31º). 
8 Overseas municipalities, belonging to the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira were excluded 
from the analysis. 
Regarding the Portuguese geographical organization, one should mention that during the period analyzed 
four municipalities were created: Amadora, in 1979, and Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela, in 1998. Other 
minor changes, like the creation of new freguesias, were ignored since the impact of those changes is 
expected to be negligible. 
 13
missing years, 1984 and 1985, data was collected from the annual report Finanças 
Locais: aplicação em 1984 /1985 (Indicadores Municipais) also from the responsibility 
of the Municipalities General Direction’s. 
The illiteracy rate and the data on the percentage of population by sector of 
activity were obtained from the Portuguese National Statistical Office’s (Instituto 
Nacional de Estatística – INE) Census operation. Data were available for 1981, 1991 
and 2001; a constant growth rate was assumed to fill in the missing data. Data on 
population by age was obtained by assuming a constant growth rate for the period 1979-
1989, on the basis of the 1970 and 1981’ Census operations; for the rest of the period, 
annual data was acquired from the Portuguese National Statistical Office’s Resident 
Population Estimates. Purchasing power index data were obtained from the Portuguese 
National Statistical Office. These data are available for 1993, 1995, 1997 and 2000. We 
assumed a constant growth rate for the years in between. Consumer price indexes were 
acquired from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
Political data, namely election dates and municipal electoral results, were 
obtained from the National Electoral Commission (“Comissão Nacional de Eleições”) 
and from the Technical Staff for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process 
(“Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o Processo Eleitoral”) of the Internal Affairs 
Ministry. 
 
5. The model 
In this paper we apply a political-economy approach to investigate the 
determinants of the grant allocation process from the central government to local 
authorities. We model real per capita grants to municipalities (GRANTit) as a function 
of lags of the dependent variable; a vector of variables related with the public choice 
idea that policymakers take into account their personal interests in the grant allocation 
process (PUB_CHOICEit); and, a vector of control variables associated with the 
normative approach, that views the grant giver as a social well-being maximizer 
(NORMit). 
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The dependent variable, GRANTit, is defined in per capita terms in order to take 
into account size differences among municipalities, and avoid heterosckedasticity 
problems. It is measured in 1995 euros, to control for price increases over time. 
 The first vector of variables (PUB_CHOICEit) consists of political variables that 
allow us to test if grant givers are self-motivated and if local incumbents’ pressures 
influence the granting process. The following variables were considered: 
- MUN_ELECTit: dummy variable equal to one in municipal election years, and to 
zero in the other years. It is our belief that mayors exert pressure on the central 
government in order to receive a larger amount of funds during municipal election 
years, so that they have more resources available for electoral campaigns and vote-
enhancing expenditures9. A positive sign is expected for the estimated coefficient 
associated with this variable. 
- SAME_PARTYit: dummy variable that takes the value of one when the mayor and 
the prime-minister belong to the same party. This variable allows us to test if 
similarity of party affiliation between local and central politicians increases the 
amount of grants made to a municipality. 
- YEARS_IN_OFFICEit: number of years that a mayor has been in office10. We 
expect the ability of a mayor to extract a larger amount of funds from the central 
government to increase with the number of years he has been in office. Therefore, a 
positive coefficient is expected for the estimated coefficient associated with this 
variable.  
- LEG_ELECTit: dummy variable equal to one in legislative election years, and to 
zero in the remaining years. In order to increase its popularity, the central 
government is likely to transfer a larger amount of funds to municipalities in 
legislative election years. We expect the estimated coefficient associated with this 
variable to be positively signed. 
The second group of explanatory variables (NORMit) consists of demographic, 
economic and social variables that allow us to test if the granting process strives for 
improvements of social welfare. These variables proxy the macroeconomic situation of 
the country, the municipalities’ social and economic development, and capture 
                                                          
9 Recall that during the period analyzed municipal elections in Portugal always took place in December. 
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differences in local population needs. The following variables are included in this 
vector11: 
-  POP_CATit: population category is a discrete variable equal to 1 for Lisbon and 
Porto, 2 for other municipalities with population over 40000, 3 for municipalities 
with population between 10000 and 40000 and, 4 for the remaining 
municipalities12. This variable intends to capture differences in municipalities’ 
needs that depend on their population. 
- AREAit: area in squared kilometers. A positive coefficient is expected for the 
estimated coefficient associated with this variable, since municipalities with larger 
areas need more resources for rural roads, etc.. 
- COASTLINEit: dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for municipalities that 
belong to districts (Distritos) along the coastline, and zero for those that belong to 
districts located in the interior of mainland Portugal. Since the districts along the 
coastline are the richest and most developed ones, a negative sign is expected for 
the estimated coefficient. 
- DEP_RATIOit-1: percentage of the population under 15 or over 65 years old in the 
last year. The estimated coefficient associated with this variable is expected to be 
positive because these groups of the population demand specific services typically 
provided by local authorities, such as elementary education and facilities for the 
elderly. 
- ILLITERACYit-1: illiteracy rate in the last year. This variable allows us to test if the 
central government intends to promote equity among municipalities. A positive 
sign is expected for the estimated coefficient. 
- %POP_PRIMit-1 and %POP_TERTit-1: the percentage of the municipality’s 
population employed, respectively, in the primary sector and in the tertiary sector 
during the last year. They are control variables that help capture municipalities’ 
differences. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
10 There are no term limits in Portugal. 
11 Although it would be desirable to include in this vector a variable capturing the municipalities’ private 
income per capita, this data is not available for the whole period. Data on municipal purchasing power 
index exists only for 1993, 1995, 1997 and 2000. 
12 These population categories are used in the legislation to determine the mayors’ salaries. 
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- GDP(-1)it-1: per capita GDP at 1995 prices. Since the macroeconomic performance 
of the country directly affects tax revenues collected by the central government, it 
may condition the amount of funds transferred to municipalities. A positive sign is 
expected for the estimated coefficient associated with this variable. 
The last five independent variables are lagged one year because it takes time for 
economic data to be released and for policymakers to take them into account in the 
grant allocation process. 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
work. 
 
 (Table 4, Page 28) 
 
The baseline empirical model is described in equation (1), where t represents the 
year, i the municipality, p the number of lags of the dependent variable included in the 
model13, β and γ are vectors of parameters to be estimated, νi is the individual effect of 
municipality i, and eit the error term: 
iti
'
t,i
'
itjt,i
p
1j
jit NORMCHOICE_PUBGRANTGRANT ε+υ+γ++α= −
=
∑ β     
  i = 1 …, N;   t = 1,…,Ti (1) 
The model described above could be estimated assuming municipalities’ 
individual effects as fixed or random. However, the lagged value of the dependent 
variable would be correlated with the error term, εit, even if the latter is not serially 
correlated, leading to inconsistent model estimates. This occurs because there is a clear 
dominance of cross sections (N=275)14 over time periods (T=23) in our sample. 
 Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) estimator to solve these problems. By first differencing equation (1) individual 
                                                          
13 The optimal number of lags was determined according to their statistical significance and the absence 
of auto-correlation. 
14 When taking lags and first-differences, the observations for three municipalities created in 1998 
(Odivelas, Trofa and Vizela) are dropped, leading to a panel of 275 municipalities and 20 years of 
observations. 
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effects (νi) are removed and the resulting equation becomes estimable by instrumental 
variables: 
it
'
t,i
'
it
p
1j
jt,ijit NORMCHOICE_PUBGRANTGRANT ε∆+γ∆+∆+α∆=∆ ∑
=
− β   
 i = 1 …, N;   t = 1,…,Ti (2) 
The valid instruments are levels of the dependent variable, lagged two or more 
periods; levels of the endogenous variables, lagged two or more periods; levels of the 
pre-determined variables, lagged one or more periods; and the levels of the exogenous 
variables, current or lagged or, simply, the first differences of the exogenous variables. 
 More moment conditions are available if we assume that the explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with the individual effects. In this case, the first lags of these 
variables can be used as instruments in the levels equation. Lagged differences of the 
dependent variable may also be valid instruments for the levels equations. Blundell and 
Bond (1998) show that this extended GMM estimator is preferable to that of Arellano 
and Bond (1991) when the dependent variable and/or the independent variables are 
persistent15. 
 
6. Empirical results 
In this section we describe the results of our empirical analysis. We started by 
testing the model using as dependent variable the total amount of grants received by the 
municipalities (expressed in real and per capita terms) and, then, we disaggregated the 
series in capital and current grants (also in real, per capita, terms). Estimation results 
for the first model, using the method system-GMM for linear dynamic panel data 
models are presented in table 5. It presents the two-step results, using robust standard 
errors corrected for finite samples16. T-statistics are presented between parentheses and 
the degree of statistical significance is signaled with asterisks. The results of m1, m2 
                                                          
15 Since there is some persistence of transfers, it is appropriate to estimate this system-GMM. 
Furthermore, difference Sargan tests indicate that, for our data, the system-GMM is preferable to the 
GMM that only includes the first-differenced equations. 
16 Although it is more common to present the one-step results because the two-step standard errors are 
generally biased downwards, that problem does not apply to our case, since the econometric software 
PcGive 10.2 uses the finite-sample correction suggested by Windmeijer (2000). Thus, we present the 
two-step results, as these have the advantage of being consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
 18
and Sargan tests are reported at the foot of the table, as well as the number of 
observations and municipalities17. All equations were estimated including all available 
instruments. 
 
(Table 5, Page 29)
 
Column 1 shows estimates of our “baseline” model that includes all variables 
considered in the model description. Several findings are immediately evident. First, the 
significance of lagged grants suggests that they suffer from some degree of inertia18. 
Second, regarding political issues, the four variables considered turned out to be highly 
statistically significant. As predicted by public choice theories, namely by the political 
business cycles literature19, grants increase during election years. Results indicate that, 
for all else equal, total grants per capita increase by 12.32 euros of 1995 in municipal 
election years, a relative increase (compared to the sample mean) of 5.1%. This is in 
accordance with our prior that mayors’ lobby to receive more grants during balloting 
years in order to have more funds available for electoral campaigns and vote-enhancing 
expenditures20. During legislative election years total grants per capita also increase by 
9.03 euros, a percentual increase of 3.7. This result reveals the central government’s 
opportunistic behavior, which uses grant increases to capture votes and improve its 
likelihood of reelection. Furthermore, the data suggests that municipalities run by 
mayors that belong to the prime-minister’s party receive a larger amount of grants per 
capita than the others (1.8%). Our estimates also reveal that the longer a mayor has 
been in office the larger the amount of grants received by his municipality. This may 
reflect mayors’ accumulation of knowledge on how the Portuguese granting system 
works, and therefore, a stronger ability to extract a larger share of the distributed funds 
from the grant giver. 
                                                          
17 See footnote 13. 
18 The choice of the number of lags to include was based on their statistical significance and on the need 
to avoid second order autocorrelation of the residuals. Although the second lag of GRANT is not 
statistically significant, there is second order autocorrelation of the residuals when it is not included. 
19 According to rational opportunistic business cycles models, such as those presented in Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990), incumbents relax fiscal policy before balloting periods to increase their 
reelection chances.  
20 Veiga and Veiga (2004) empirical results provide evidence of opportunistic behaviour by Portuguese 
mayors, evidenced by pre-election increases in expenditure items highly visible to the electorate, such as 
investment expenditures on overpasses, streets and complementary works and rural roads. 
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Third, regarding the control variables, estimates suggest, as expected, that grants 
per capita increase with the established population categories, with the municipalities 
area and with their dependency ratio. The variables measuring the percentage of 
population working in the primary and the tertiary sectors turned out to be statistically 
significant, positively signed in the first case, and negatively in the second. The 
estimated coefficient for the dummy variable associated with municipalities belonging 
to coastline districts is negatively signed, as we expected, but it turned out not to be 
statistically significant. GDP per capita, included to capture the macroeconomic 
performance of the country, also turned out correctly signed but statistically 
insignificant. To our surprise, the illiteracy rate is negatively signed and highly 
statistically significant. 
Because the high degree of correlation between the illiteracy rate and the 
dependency ratio, as well as with the percentage of the population in the primary sector 
(80% and 70%, respectively), may cause multicollinearity problems, we decided to drop 
this variable. In the estimation results presented in column 2 we can see that the lags of 
the dependent variable kept their significance, and that all the political variables are still 
highly statistically significant. Regarding the control variables, the coastline dummy 
and the GDP per capita variable now turned out to be marginally statistically significant 
and correctly signed. 
We proceeded with our empirical analysis by applying the last model described 
to real, per capita, capital and current grants. Results are presented in table 6. As in the 
previous table, in both specifications, there is evidence of strong persistence in the 
series and of the importance of political forces in the allocation of grants from the 
central government to municipalities. The dummy variable for municipal election years 
turned out to be statistically significant and with the expected (positive) sign. In 
legislative balloting years, both capital and current grants transferred to local 
governments increase, suggesting that governments manipulate grants to attract votes. 
Furthermore, similarity of party affiliation between local and central officeholders 
increases the amount of capital and current grants made to a municipality. Regarding 
the number of years a mayor has been in office, there is evidence that it increases the 
amount of capital grants received by the municipality, but not of current grants. All the 
control variables have the same sign as in the previous table, but their degree of 
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statistical significance is now much smaller, particularly in the estimation for current 
grants. 
 
(Table 6, Page 30)
 
7. Conclusions 
Using an unexplored and detailed sample consisting of all Portuguese mainland 
municipalities for the 1979 to 2001 period we investigate the determinants of the 
intergovernmental grants allocation system. Our results present strong evidence that 
political factors exert an important role in this process. During municipal and legislative 
election years grants transferred to municipalities increase, which may reflect the 
opportunistic behaviour of incumbent politicians interested in improving their 
probabilities of re-election. Furthermore, municipalities ruled by mayors that belong to 
the prime-minister’s party seem to be favoured in the allocation process, and the longer 
a mayor has been in office the larger the amount of grants transferred to his 
municipality. 
Our results also reveal that total grants per capita transferred to a local 
jurisdiction are influenced by social, economic and demographic variables 
characterizing it, as suggested by the normative approach to intergovernamental grants. 
The population category, area, dependency ratio, and percentage of the population 
working in the tertiary sector positively affect the amount of grants received; while the 
percentage of the population working in the primary sector exerts a negative impact. 
The importance of political variables in the granting system, and of the 
distortions they may generate, has policy implications. First, it highlights the need for 
the allocation process to be formula driven. That is, the amount of grants transferred to 
local authorities should not depend on the political cycle nor on party affiliation. 
Second, our result that the longer a mayor has been in office the larger the amount of 
grants his municipality receives provides an argument for the introduction of term limits 
to Portuguese local politicians. 
Although preliminary, our results are quite robust. In future research we intend 
to further disaggregate the data on transfers, and increase the number of socio-economic 
and demographic variables characterizing the municipalities. 
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Table 1: Legislative electoral results 
 PS PPD/PSD CDS/PP AD PCP 
1975(a) 37.87% 26.39% 7.61%  12.46% 
1976 34.98% 24.03% 15.89% - 14.50% 
1979 27.43% - - 42.24% 18.96%(c) 
1980 27.13%(b) - - 44.40% 16.92%(c) 
1983 36.35% 27.04% 12.38% - 18.20%(c) 
1985 20.82% 29.79% 9.74% - 15.55%(c) 
1987 22.30% 50.15% 4.34% - 12.18%(d) 
1991 29.25% 50.43% 4.38% - 8.84%(e) 
1995 43.85% 34.00% 9.09% - 8.61%(e) 
1999 44.00% 32.32% 8.38% - 9.02%(e) 
2002 37.84% 40.15% 8.75%  6.97%(e) 
Source: National Elections Commission. 
Notes: PS - Socialist Party; PPD/PSD - People’s Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party; CDS/PP - 
Democratic and Social Center / People’s Party; AD - Democratic Alliance (PSD + CDS + PPM - 
Monarchic People’s Party); PCP - Portuguese Communist Party. The results for the smaller 
parties are not shown. There are usually about a dozen parties competing in the legislative 
elections. 
 (a) The 1975 elections served to elect the members of the Constituent Assembly, which was 
assigned the task of drafting the new Portuguese Constitution. The country was still ruled by 
provisional governments and the Junta of National Salvation until April 1976. 
 (b) Socialist Revolutionary Front (FRS): PS + small socialist parties. 
 (c) United People’s Alliance (APU): PCP + MDP/CDE (Portuguese Democratic Movement). 
 (d) Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU): PCP + dissidents of MDP + PEV (Green-Ecologist 
Party). 
 (e) PCP + PEV 
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Table 2: Legislative elections and parties in government since 1979 
Dates of elections Winning party 
Share in 
Parliament Prime Minister Form of government 
- 
- 
December 2, 1979 
October 5, 1980 
April 25, 1983 
October 6, 1985 
July 19, 1987 
October 6, 1991 
October 1, 1995 
October 10, 1999 
March 17, 2002 
- 
- 
AD 
AD 
PS 
PPD/PSD 
PPD/PSD 
PPD/PSD 
PS 
PS 
PPD/PSD 
- 
- 
47% 
49% 
69% 
34% 
59% 
58% 
48% 
50% 
46% 
Mota Pinto 
M. L. Pintassilgo 
Freitas do Amaral 
Pinto Balsemão 
Mário Soares 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
Cavaco Silva 
António Guterres 
António Guterres 
Durão Barroso 
Pres. appointment (1978-79) 
Pres. appointment (1979-80) 
Coalition (PSD+CDS+PPM) 
Coalition (PSD+CDS+PPM) 
Coalition (PS+PSD) 
One party, minority 
One party 
One party 
One party, minority 
One party, minority 
Coalition (PSD+CDS/PP) 
Source: National Elections Commission. 
Note: PPD/PSD - People’s Democratic Party / Social Democratic Party; PS - Socialist Party; CDS/PP - 
Democratic and Social Center / People’s Party; PPM - Monarchic People’s Party; AD = PSD + 
CDS + PPM 
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Table 3: Allocation criteria of unconditional grants to municipalities  
 Law n. 42/98 
National 
Budget 
Law 2001
 
Law n. 
1/79 
artº 5º.b)
Law n. 
1/79 
artº 5º.c)
Decree-
law n. 
98/84 
Law n. 
1/87 
National 
Budget 
Law 1992 FGM FCM FBM
Population 50% 35% 45% 45% 40% - - - 
Population/Nights spend in 
tourism facilities - - - - - 35% - - 
Area 10% 15% 10% 10% 15% 30% (d) - - 
Per capita direct taxes 40% - 15% 10% - 10% - - 
Fiscal need index - - - - 5% - - - 
Number of freguesias - 15% 5% 5% - 15% - - 
Road Network - (a) - 10% 10% - - - 
Number of dwellings - - - 5% - - - - 
Accessibility index - - - (b) 5% - - - 
Needs index - 35% 20% - - - - - 
Socio-economic development 
index - - - 5% - - - - 
Population under 15 years old - - - - 5% 5% - - 
Development index (c) - - - - - - 100% - 
Equal amount to all 
municipalities - - 5% 10% 15% 5% - 100%
 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Diário da República. 
Notes:  (a) Included in the needs index. 
 (b) Included in the socio-economic development index. 
 (c) Allocated only to municipalities with an index below the national average. 
 (d) Weighted by a factor related to altimetry. 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables N.Obs. Average Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
Grants:   
Total grant 6 131 242.2 169.5 10.3 1 890.5
Capital grant 6 131 133.5 102.6 2.2 1 193.8
Current grant 6 131 108.8 76.3 0.0 696.7
Political variables:   
Municipal Election Year 6 333 0.3 0.5 0 1
Same Party 6 321 0.4 0.5 0 1
Years in Office 6 314 6.4 4.7 1 25
Legislative Election Year 6 332 0.3 0.5 0 1
Socio-economic variables   
Population Category 6 333 3.1 0.7 1 4
Area 6 333 322.22 281.48 8.26 1 720.67
Coast Line 6 333 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0
Dependency Ratio 6 332 36.6 4.0 23.2 58.2
Purchasing Power Index 2 200 63.3 31.9 10.1 314.2
Illiteracy rate 6 327 18.7 8.2 3.7 55.0
% Population employed in the primary 6 327 25.0 17.8 0.2 84.5
% Population employed in the tertiary 6 327 41.1 14.2 2.0 85.6
GDP per capita at 1995 prices 6 327 6 729.5 1 975.6 4 072.2 9 976.7
Sources: DGAL, INE, OCDE, STAPE and municipal official accounts. 
Note:  All types of grants are expressed in euros (at 1995 prices) per capita. 
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Table 5: Estimation results for total grants 
 (1) (2) 
Grant (-1) .81 
(25.2)*** 
.83 
(26.2)*** 
Grant (-2) -.03 
(-.99) 
-.02 
(-.89) 
Grant (-3) .12 
(3.08)*** 
.11 
(2.95)*** 
MUN_ELECT 12.32 
(5.77)*** 
11.05 
(5.14)*** 
SAME_PARTY 4.45 
(2.20)** 
5.22 
(2.53)** 
YEARS_IN_OFFICE 1.14 
(4.65)*** 
1.30 
(5.39)*** 
LEG_ELECT  9.03 
(4.98)*** 
8.36 
(4.56)*** 
POP_CAT 32.54 
(8.89)*** 
27.27 
(6.64)*** 
AREA .03 
(4.68)*** 
. 01 
(2.88)*** 
COASTLINE -5.98 
(-1.55) 
-6.75 
(-1.92)* 
DEPEND_RATIO(-1) 2.80 
(5.17)*** 
1.74 
(3.40)*** 
ILLITERACY(-1) -1.91 
(-6.42)*** 
 
%POP_PRIM(-1) -.48 
(-3.70)*** 
-.86 
(-7.02)*** 
%POP_TERT(-1) .52 
(3.55)*** 
.56 
(3.81)*** 
GDP(-1) .0009 
(1.38) 
.001 
(1.86)* 
m1 -7.92 -7.94 
m2 .77 .70 
Sargan (p-value) .194 .166 
No. Observations 4 927 4 927 
No. Municipalities 275 275 
Notes: - Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations 
in first-differences with the equations in levels), using the econometric software PcGive 
10.2; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
- m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. 
- Sargan is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM 
estimators, asymptotically χ2. P-value is reported. 
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Table 6: Estimation results for capital and current grants 
 Capital Current 
Grant (-1) .74 
(24.9)*** 
1.11 
(88.2)*** 
MUN_ELECT 8.02 
(4.79)*** 
1.05 
(2.66)*** 
SAME_PARTY 5.73 
(3.28)*** 
1.65 
(3.52)*** 
YEARS_IN_OFFICE 1.04 
(5.02)*** 
.04 
(.99) 
LEG_ELECT  5.46 
(3.61)*** 
4.65 
(9.23)*** 
POP_CAT 28.20 
(9.43)*** 
-.18 
(-.16) 
AREA .01 
(3.10)*** 
. 00004 
(.43) 
COASTLINE -2.46 
(-.70) 
.33 
(.66) 
DEPEND_RATIO(-1) 1.69 
(3.87)*** 
-.15 
(-1.83)* 
%POP_PRIM(-1) -.61 
(-7.46)*** 
.008 
(.30) 
%POP_TERT(-1) .61 
(5.08)*** 
-.04 
(-2.39)** 
GDP(-1) .0008 
(1.41) 
.0001 
(1.24) 
m1 -8.45 -5.11 
m2 -.22 .38 
Sargan (p-value) .320 .181 
No. Observations 5 671 5 665 
No. Municipalities 275 275 
Notes: - Estimations of system-GMM linear models for panel data (which combine the equations 
in first-differences with the equations in levels), using the econometric software PcGive 
10.2; 
- two-step results using robust standard errors corrected for finite samples; 
- T-statistics are between parentheses. Significance level for which the null hypothesis is 
rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%. 
- m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. 
- Sargan is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions for the GMM 
estimators, asymptotically χ2. P-value is reported. 
 
